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Abstract 
 This thesis will provide a thorough examination of counterterrorism in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States. A multifaceted analysis of Jordan’s 
counterterrorism (the socio-economic and political drivers of terrorism, historical efforts 
of counterterrorism, and its contemporary successes and failures) will be complimented 
by a generalized report of U.S.	counterterrorism. The successes of Jordanian 
counterterrorism were analyzed to reveal whether or not certain practices could be 
implemented in America. While considering the political, social, and cultural differences 
between the two countries, it was clear that the two allies understandably operate on a 
similar agenda when it comes to fighting the war on terror. However, Jordan has a unique 
approach to easing the threat of violent extremism that could potentially benefit the 
United States.  
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Introduction 
One of the greatest challenges facing the modern world is the phenomenon of 
terrorism. A global epidemic, terrorism has rapidly and drastically changed the way states 
view national security. As nations combat this style of unconventional warfare in a 
globalized era, we see relationships strengthen between states that previously had little in 
common. Two countries, Jordan and the United States, are prime examples of how 
terrorism can take two vastly different nations and turn them into strong, cohesive allies.  
In order to understand how these two states keep up with the changing nature of 
terrorism, we must examine both their counterterrorism practices as well as their 
relationship with one another. Maintaining the importance of the systemic causes of 
terrorism such as poverty, unemployment, and political discontent, we will analyze how 
Jordan and the United States factor contemporary dynamics such as social media, global 
discourse, and regional politics into their counterterrorism strategy.  
Through a comparative analysis, we can assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
one state’s counterterrorism and compare them to the other. By analyzing the differences, 
we can then decide whether tactics that work in Jordan could be successful in America. 
Because Jordan’s case will be examined in greater detail, we will first explore 
counterterrorism in the United States. 
 
United	States Counterterrorism 
 Considered by many to be the face of Western power, the United States has been 
a central target for terror attacks carried out by radical Islamic fundamentalists. However, 
America’s relationship with terrorism dates back far before the international rise of 
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religious extremism in the 1970s. From the birth of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1860s, the 
assassination of President McKinley in 1901, to the September 11th attacks in 2001, the 
U.S. has seen its history spotted with both domestic and international terror attacks. The 
constant prevalence of terrorism in the United States has brought counter-terrorism (CT) 
and countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts to the forefront of American politics. 
With this has emerged a sophisticated and encompassing conglomerate of intelligence 
bureaus, law enforcement agencies, and other organizations that form the U.S.	
counterterrorism force. Not only have the resources used by these agencies evolved over 
time, but the way they go about combatting violent extremism has changed as well.  
 One of the first tactics used by the American government to combat terrorism was 
the implementation of new legislation. Still lacking a concise definition, the term 
“terrorism” was being used in congressional bills as early as 1989, with the submission of 
the Biological Weapons Anti-terrorism Act (Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 
1989). As the 1990s and 2000s brought more terror attacks against the West, counter-
terrorism legislation began to roll through Congress in a retroactive manner.  
The most significant piece of CT legislation passed to date, the USA PATRIOT 
Act, brought to light many of the contentious avenues used to combat terror at home. 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2001), an acronym for Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act is an omnibus tool designed to ramp up 
America’s defense. The act expanded the many resources/tactics previously used to 
combat organized crime to now include terrorism. It also promoted coherent information 
sharing among government agencies and increased punishments for those involved in the 
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planning or carrying out of terror attacks (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). Although 
some have accused the USA PATRIOT Act of impeding the privacy of American 
citizens, I would argue that its implementation has strengthened America’s ability to 
quickly and effectively prevent attacks.  
 Not only does Congress pass legislation concerning home defense, but it also 
takes action in an attempt to diminish the threat of terror from overseas. Senate bill 1595 
and H.R. 2712 are prospective bills dealing with attacking the financial means of 
Hizbullah and groups that support Palestinian terrorism, respectively (GovTrack(a), 
GovTrack(b), 2017). Other pieces of legislation, such as H.R. 4564, focuses on 
conducting a threat assessment of foreign fighter activity abroad, which will in turn help 
guide national security officials in prioritizing countries at risk of disseminating 
extremists (Congress.gov). 
 As the nature of terrorism fluctuates, so does the government’s response to it. It is 
clear that modern technology and social media have become key components of 
recruitment and radicalization efforts by extremist groups. The U.S.	government is 
desperately trying to stay ahead of the learning curve to thwart attacks derived from some 
new medium of influence. In 2015, Rep. Michael McCaul introduced the CVE Act—a 
bill intended to revitalize America’s CT abilities (Congressional Documents and 
Publications, 2015). This act proposed reorganization within the Department of 
Homeland Security to specifically include an Office for Countering Violent Extremism. 
This office would be charged with erecting a CVE program to, among other things, carry 
out counter-propaganda campaigns against extremist organizations. Although it was 
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never enacted into law, this bill shows the shifting strategy of America’s CVE efforts 
(Congressional Documents and Publications, 2015). 
 Along with legislative action, efforts within local communities to combat 
extremism led the way for the U.S.	CVE initiative. When it comes to the issue of Islamic 
jihad, language and cultural barriers can often isolate Muslim communities from the rest 
of the country. Because the United States is not a homogenous mix of ethnicities, 
languages, and religions, cultural divides can create misunderstandings and impede 
justice. However, the American government is aiming to bridge these gaps in hopes of 
minimizing extremist attacks through information sharing. According to Bjelopera 
(2014), the concept of community policing and cross-cultural engagement is absolutely 
necessary to fight Islamic extremism within the United States. Professor Deborah 
Ramirez elaborates, pointing out that “Embedded within these communities…are the 
linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in 
its efforts to identify suspicious behavior (Bjelopera, 2014, p. 5).” In order to eliminate 
the fear of surveillance during these community engagements, the government has 
specifically acknowledged that information gathering and investigations will be kept 
separate from constructive dialogue (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.). 
 The digital age has brought on a new set of issues when it comes to combatting 
terrorist organizations. Not only has this provided another medium for radicals to 
exchange information and plot attacks, but it has also elevated recruitment efforts to an 
unprecedented level. Through the Internet, extremists can now reach vulnerable 
audiences that were previously inaccessible; pitching their message to young people 
thousands of miles away instead of those in a nearby village.  
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 In 2015, Rashad Hussain unveiled the goal of the Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) at a CVE Summit in Sydney, Australia 
(Hussain, 2015). Through certain propaganda strategies, this American initiative is 
designed to discredit the brand of groups like the Islamic State, while promoting healthy 
ways for at-risk youth to overcome hardships. Hussain goes on to explain exactly how 
this inter-agency program would attempt to holistically shut down the media appeal of 
terrorist organizations. When targeting the Islamic State, for example, the CSCC would 
disseminate stories of “poor living conditions under ISIL, ISIL battlefield losses and 
internal divisions, ISIL atrocities, particularly against Muslims” through the words of 
ISIL defectors. The statements of “credible voices in the Muslim world” would be used 
to discredit the radical ideology used to back the actions of these groups. The CSCC calls 
for a more active ant-ISIS dialogue to sweep social media, instead of merely ignoring the 
extremist message. The program also promotes the stories of Muslim youth that become 
successful in the modern world; examples that will hopefully reach dejected young 
people whose dreams of a better life seem dismal (Hussain, 2015). 
 Government-led programs aren’t the only actors in the fight against extremist 
propaganda. According to Chang (2017), “Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and YouTube 
recently formed the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, which aims to bring the 
four web giants together to swap data and technology and to develop a set of best 
practices for countering extremism on their platforms.” These corporations are employing 
their own type of CT tactics, such as offering ad credits to anti-extremist groups, 
removing content from known terrorist organizations, and compiling and sharing flagged 
users/content with other tech companies and law enforcement agencies (Chang, 2017). 
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 Aside from government intervention via intelligence and law enforcement, the 
civilian sector has taken on counter-terrorism roles through forming watchdog groups. 
Many of these organizations in America are aimed to combat far-right extremists, which 
usually fall under the classifications of being anti-Semitic, white supremacist, and/or 
adhere to a hard-liner view of Christianity. According to Michael (2001), The Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) are two major 
watchdog groups in the United	States. Their tactics vary when it comes to keeping right-
wing extremists in check. They will often keep tabs on the leaders of such groups, 
collecting any information that could lead to their removal. Both the ADL and the SPLC 
work closely with law-enforcement agencies, and the ADL has a powerful lobbying wing 
in Washington, D.C. (p. 283). In its efforts to bring down hate groups, the SPLC has 
brought forth several civil suits against members, often times bankrupting the 
organization tasked with defending its member (p. 285). Using hate crime statutes as their 
main weapon, the SPLC has been able to successfully keep in check many right-wing 
radicals in the United States.   
 In addition to employing its own counter-terrorism campaign, the U.S. has 
facilitated several international CT initiatives and used its diplomatic ties to reinforce the 
efforts of other nations. Through effective cooperation, the United State’s diplomatic 
wing has proven to be as successful as its military might.  
 In 2016, representatives from the United	States Department of Justice, 
Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department met with members from the 
U.N.’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and Interpol to discuss methods of 
improving information sharing (Asia News Monitor, 2016). The leaders of these 
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departments highlighted existing databases that could be better utilized in the fight 
against terror. According to Asia News Monitor, senior DHS officials advocated for the 
use of the Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record information 
sharing, which could be a vital tool in streamlining the identification process of suspected 
terrorists. In addition to this, Interpol also debriefed department leaders on the usefulness 
of its Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) Database; another crucial mechanism that could be 
used to disrupt FTF travel (Asia News Monitor, 2016). Biometric and biographic 
information of suspected terrorists is also transmitted between governments, according to 
the National Strategy for Information sharing (U.S. Director of National Intelligence, 
2007, p. 25) 
 Combining the aforementioned practices of international information sharing and 
opposing propaganda, the United States launched a two-week project in 2015 called 
“Countering Radical Ideologies”, according to the Asia News Monitor (2015). This 
exchange program encouraged interaction between government officials, private sector 
branding experts, and community activists in hopes of sharing effective methods to 
counter and defeat the Islamic State’s message (Asia News Monitor, 2015). 
 In addition to building on its own CVE strategy, the United States has been a 
worldwide leader in assisting governments and civilian organizations in creating their 
own CVE programs.  
According to the Asia News Monitor (2016), Kenya and Djibouti are leading the 
charge in establishing an effective CVE system in East Africa; a region tormented by 
terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab. Kenya hosted a CVE summit in 2015 and 
commissioned a senior-level diplomat to head its CVE program. Within Nairobi and 
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Mombasa, members of the local community are doing their part to open dialogues and 
work with law enforcement to stunt the spread of extremism. In an effort to assist 
community-level activists that may not have the framework to combat a threat such as 
extremism, the United States has in place organizations such as the Strong Cities 
Network and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund to provide much 
needed funding and resources. Similarly in the north, Djibouti established the East Africa 
CVE Center of Excellence and Counter-messaging hub, which is aimed at gathering and 
sharing the best CVE practices that have proved effective in East African nations (Asia 
News Monitor, 2016).  
 In Pakistan, the United	States has invested over $30 billion in CT efforts since 
the September 11th attacks (Gall, 2011), yet several terrorist groups still remain active 
within the country. Until 2011, this included al-Qaeda’s late leader Osama Bin Laden, 
who was found in a compound less than a mile away from Pakistan’s Military Academy. 
A report from the New York Times in 2011 states that the Pakistan’s main intelligence 
agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), works closely with militant extremist 
groups. According to a former militant commander, the Pakistani government still 
employs a “policy of supporting the militant groups as tools in Pakistan’s dispute with 
India over the border territory of Kashmir and in Afghanistan to drive out American and 
NATO forces” (Gall, 2011). 
 This nebulous relationship of trust that has developed between the United	States 
and Pakistan has led the U.S. to focus more on implementing CVE programs within the 
civilian sector of Pakistan (Gall, 2011). Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have taken 
the lead in challenging extremist groups like Pakistan’s version of the Taliban. An 
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impressive array of counter-terror initiatives have been implemented by the people of 
Pakistan at all different levels of society. When it comes to countering the extremist 
narrative, community leaders have organized public rallies against the Taliban, radio 
stations have broadcasted counter-radical messages, and youth activists such as Syed Ali 
Abbas Zaidi have painted peaceful statements on rickshaws. Civilian activists also target 
the youth in their CVE efforts, promoting peaceful conflict resolution and encouraging 
cultural and religious acceptance between Hindus and Muslims (Gall, 2011).  
 The third and probably most well known branch of U.S. counter-terrorism is the 
use of its military. According to the Watson Institute of International & Public Affairs 
(2017), the United States is involved in 39% of the world’s nations, operating in some 
mode of counterterrorism. It has carried out air and drone strikes in seven countries, has 
combat troops in fifteen countries, military bases in 44 countries, and is providing some 
sort of counterterrorism training or support to 58 countries (Watson Institute of 
International & Public Affairs, 2017). Since the September 11th attacks, the United States 
has taken a hard-line approach of intervening in other nations to root out sources of 
terror. Beginning in 2001, the United	States initiated its “Global War on Terror”, which 
was the justification it gave for invading Iraq in 2003. Since then, American military 
forces have been involved in fighting Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Yemen, and in North and East Africa. The United	States has been battling the Taliban in 
Afghanistan since it was ousted from power in 2001, which seems to be a conflict with 
no end in sight. Continued airstrikes against the Islamic State has aided in the campaign 
that has nearly crushed the terrorist organization, territorially speaking.  
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 Keeping in mind the history and current strategy of counterterrorism in the United 
States, we will now take a look at counterterrorism in Jordan. Although it faces a similar 
enemy, Jordan’s economic, political, and social environment is much different than that 
of the United States, and thus affects its approach to counterterrorism. 
 
Jordanian Counterterrorism 
 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is often noted as a “beacon of stability,” given 
the regional turmoil that has plagued the Middle East. While it borders nations that have 
undergone violent regime change (Iraq), bloody civil war (Syria) and perpetual ethnic 
conflict (Israel/Palestine), Jordan has managed to not only maintain political and civil 
order, but also strive for economic advancement. Liberalized markets, combined with 
simplified licensing procedures and a booming industrial complex (AIIE) is a hopeful 
start to a nation currently facing an uneasy economic situation (Prisma Reports, 2017). 
  
There are a multitude of factors playing in to the contentious atmosphere that 
confronts the Hashemite Kingdom today. At the epicenter of the people’s frustration is 
unemployment and poverty.  Trading Economics (2018) states that Jordan is facing the 
highest unemployment rate the country has seen in 10 years. With an 18% national 
average in the second quarter of 2017, this trend is a cause is cause for concern. Although 
the male unemployment rate has only gone up .4% in the past year (13% to 13.4%), the 
amount of women without a job has skyrocketed from 22.8% to 33.9% (Trading 
Economics, 2018).  
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Dr. Fahed Fanek, a Jordanian economist and financial consultant, believes the 
cause for the recent unemployment spike is foreign labor. He claims that Syrian refugees 
will work longer hours and for less pay than Jordanian citizens, and that some European 
nations will not trade with Jordanian industries unless the company’s workforce is at least 
15% Syrian refugees. The goal of this mandate is to permanently install Syrian refugees 
in Jordan so they will not migrate to Europe (Fanek, 2017). Other non-Jordanians make 
up about 8% of the workforce (Assad, 2012). With so many employers hiring foreign 
workers, it has become difficult for natives to find and maintain a job. In particular, the 
unemployment rate of young adults is extremely worrisome to Jordanian officials. Fifty-
eight percent of Jordan’s population is under the age of 25. The unemployment rate 
between the ages of 15-24 is 27.2%, but only 25% of this age group was economically 
active in 2014 (Chin, Gharaibeh, Woodham, & Deeb, 2016). Considering the fact that 
extremist recruiters target younger individuals, having 75% of the youth population 
(approximately 2.8 million people) with no job and growing animosity is a nightmare 
when it comes to curbing the extremist appeal.  
The Syrian refugee crisis has exacerbated the hardships already facing the 
Jordanian people. Beginning in 2011 with the start of the Syrian civil war, a massive flow 
of civilians fleeing armed conflict and government-led attacks poured across the border 
into Jordan. In 2013, almost 3,500 refugees entered the country every day (El-Khatib, 
Scales, Vearey, & Forsberg, 2013). By March of 2017, 657,000 Syrian refugees had been 
documented in Jordan, but over 1.3 million were living in the country (Ghazal, 2017).  
Only 21% of refugees were living in camps by the beginning of 2018, which means 
hundreds of thousands of Syrians have inundated communities in northern governorates 
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such as Amman, Mafraq, and Irbid (The UN Refugee Agency, 2018). Already struggling 
to make a living, many Jordanians are having to compete with Syrian refugees for scarce 
resources, employment opportunities, healthcare, shelter, and education (Francis, 2015). 
The goal of housing such a large number of refugees is to increase stability in the 
region, but to also take the burden off of European countries in return for increased 
foreign aid. Known as the Jordan Compact, this agreement between the EU and Jordan 
will provide the Hashemite Kingdom with new corporate investments, increased 
economic aid, and support for host communities struggling to successfully assimilate 
refugees (Government of Jordan, 2016). Two major problems lie with this policy: with so 
many refugees receiving education and healthcare instead of Jordanian citizens, the 
people’s anger with the government increases. According to Francis (2015), this could be 
dangerous for the government because “public perceptions of a government’s inability to 
deliver adequate services can undermine political legitimacy” (p. 8). Terrorist agitators 
will use the people’s disdain for the refugees, and the national government’s response, to 
enrage and radicalize marginalized citizens. The second issue with this plan of housing 
refugees in exchange for foreign aid is that it increases the dependency on foreign aid to 
help sustain the kingdom. This unstable and dangerous reliance on Western aid could 
very easily decimate the Jordanian economy were it to be cut off. An economic crash of 
this sort would undoubtedly lead to an increase in extremism due to resentment of the 
national government and Western nations.   
The Kingdom’s lack of self-sufficiency has caused unrest and anger within 
Jordan. In 2016, Jordan’s imports ($19.2B) doubled its exports ($7.5) (World Integrated 
Trade Solution, 2017). The United	States alone contributed $1.3 billion in foreign aid to 
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the Hashemite Kingdom in 2017 (The Jordan Times, 2017).  It is no secret that with 
foreign assistance come foreign interests, and many of those interests often conflict with 
those of the Jordanian populace. The United	States has non-coincidentally increased its 
economic and military aid to Jordan as the Islamic State has grown to be a major threat. 
America has used Jordan as a strategic vantage point to launch operations as a part of the 
international anti-ISIS coalition. Although the majority of Jordanian citizens support a 
coalition against the Islamic State, many think Jordan should not be involved. In a survey 
given in 2016, 64% of Jordanian respondents said they support an international coalition 
against ISIS “to a large degree”, but only 47% agreed with the same level of support that 
Jordan should be involved. The majority (38%) of respondents who opposed an 
international coalition did so because they believe it is a “conspiracy targeting Muslims 
and Islam” (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2016). This could be a dangerous 
foothold for extremist propaganda. With the largest portion of foreign aid coming from a 
Western country, it would be easy for terrorist recruiters to fan the flames of an alleged 
anti-Muslim conspiracy motivating the U.S.-led coalition.  
The Jordanian government would probably still take action against ISIS if it did 
not receive any financial support from foreign nations, especially after the brutal murder 
of a Jordanian pilot in 2015. However, the fact that it is at the mercy of the United	States 
and other Western countries because of their monetary contributions may leave the 
Jordanian people feeling caught up in unnecessary international affairs. The more 
influence that Western nations appear to have on the Jordanian government, the more 
ammunition terrorist recruiters have to slander the decisions of the King; potentially de-
stabilizing the government.  
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Politically, the structure of government in Jordan has been relatively unchanged 
since the country’s inception in 1946. The kingdom has shown signs of liberalization in 
recent years, seen through the legalization of political parties in the early 1990s 
(Government and Society, 2018).  Much of the power held by the Jordanian government 
resides with the monarch. With the ability to appoint the prime minister, the cabinet, and 
members of the Senate, the king has a huge influence on the laws and policies passed. 
The king may also dissolve and replace parliament, which has been done multiple times 
since the Jordanian Constitution was implemented in 1952 (Government and Society, 
2018). With all of this control, the king is often solely commended or criticized for 
decisions made by the national government. Tensions between the populous and the 
crown have increased over recent decades, threatening to send Jordan into chaos like its 
neighbors to the north and east.  
There is a cyclical paradox that terrorists could potentially implement to de-
stabilize Jordan and achieve their objectives. All of the pivotal arguments used by 
extremist recruiters revolve around the aforementioned issues: unemployment, poverty, 
influxes of Syrian refugees, and a lack of national self-sufficiency. Terrorists will use 
these platforms to persuade vulnerable targets and eventually utilize these recruits to 
cause harm to Jordan and surrounding areas. However, according to a poll conducted by 
the Center for Insights in Survey Research, the majority of respondents that believe 
economic conditions are “good” do so because “safety and security positively impacted 
[the] economy” (Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2016). If extremists in Jordan 
are successful in recruiting and carrying out attacks, they will in turn damage the public’s 
faith in Jordan’s security and stability. This would undermine the economy, de-legitimize 
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the government, and propel terrorist organizations to the forefront while they continue to 
feed on the public’s growing anxiety.  
 Jordan’s track record of counterterrorism dates back to the late 1960s after the 
Arab-Israeli Six Day War. Since then, Jordan’s modus operandi has fluctuated when it 
comes to dealing with terrorism. The Kingdom used a more militaristic approach when it 
came to dealing with PLO organizers plotting insurrection in Jordan in 1970, as is evident 
in the Black September violence (Yom & Sammour, 2017). During the period known as 
“Black September”, the Jordanian government participated in a particularly gruesome 
counter-terrorism campaign against the PLO. This was in response to violence and talks 
of insurgency by the Palestinian group.  
However, according to Jarrar (2009), Jordan began to transition from a military-
led counterterrorism strategy to a combination of policing and conciliatory techniques 
during the 1990s. The “policing” efforts were very heavy handed, which often utilized 
the Special Forces in raid operations. This has since given the perception of a newly 
militarized police force, one that may not bode well for civilian-government relations. 
The conciliatory techniques have produced mixed results. Government amnesties became 
very prevalent in the 1990s as an attempt to alleviate grievances and prevent agitators 
from carrying out violent attacks. While in some instances this practice succeeded in 
reeling in political and Islamist radicals, royal amnesties sometimes backfired, as in the 
case of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (Jarrar, 2009, p. 17).  
Along with the supra policy implementations, Jarrar (2009) states that Jordan has 
revised its penal code to include more counterterrorism measures. The Hashemite 
Kingdom saw the main expansions in their statutory fight against terror come after the 
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9/11 attacks in the United	States and the November 9, 2005 Amman bombings. 
However, before 9/11, Jordan already had laws against terrorism in place, including 
related liability crimes such as attempt, conspiracy, and aiding/abetting. Strict 
punishments including the death penalty existed for these offenses as well. Jordan upped 
their counterterrorism laws post-9/11 mainly to show support for America’s “war on 
terror”, but the real reform came after 60 people were killed and 115 were injured in the 
Amman hotel bombings in 2005. In the aftermath of the largest terror attack carried out 
on Jordanian soil, the Kingdom responded with two major changes to its system of 
terrorism prosecutions (Jarrar, 2009).  
The first change was that collective punishment, or the punishing of anyone 
remotely involved in a terror plot, increased drastically (Jarrar, 2009). Although criminal 
deterrence has little impact on the core radicals of a group, it definitely resonates more 
with third parties who help finance and facilitate terrorist operations. The second change 
was the vast increase of trials being carried out in Jordan’s State Security Court. This 
court processes a mix of civilian and military defendants that have committed crimes 
against the state; providing defendants with fewer due process rights and harsher 
punishments. Although the increased use of the State Security Court has drawn criticism 
and resembles the martial law-era that ended in 1990, multiple sources see collective 
punishment as absolutely vital to the objective of deterrence (Jarrar, 2009 p. 29).  
 In 2006, Jordan put into place two laws in an attempt to minimize the amount of 
recruitment and radicalization that occurs in certain mosques (Jarrar, 2009). The 
government has long been monitoring imams and what they preach. Even in mosques that 
are not funded and ran by the state, Jordanian intelligence officials still maintain 
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surveillance in order to spot radical discourse. Imams who preach sermons of political 
opposition or religious radical ideals are subject to be banned indefinitely (Jarrar, 2009, p. 
48). 
 In addition to direct supervision of religious gatherings, Jarrar (2009) found that 
the Jordanian government is attempting to control radical influence in the community 
through managing collective action. Many large charitable organizations have embedded 
themselves within Jordanian neighborhoods and have built up quite the political backing. 
A few of these major organizations are Islamist in nature. Some groups, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, exist only as a political rival to the monarch, and are as old as the 
kingdom itself. However, the more recent surge of Salafist and jihadist thinkers are what 
is concerning government officials. Although some of these groups have not posed an 
extremist threat, the government has begun to regulate their finances in order to quash the 
possibility of political opposition. The Kingdom has broadened the state’s ability to 
inspect the financial records of these organizations, for profit and non-profit, in order to 
make sure there are no illegal activities being funded. The state is free to eliminate an 
organization or change its leadership as the government feels necessary; ultimately in 
hopes of stopping a radical movement before it gets going (Jarrar, 2009, p. 59).   
 In 2009, the United States helped establish the Jordan Border Security Program. 
Operating in full effect beginning in 2016, the Jordanian Border Guard combines national 
intelligence with American-led training, equipment, and weaponry to prevent the flow of 
terrorists from Syria into Jordan (Lang, Wechsler, & Awadallah, 2017). Just this year, the 
U.S.	State Department dedicated a counterterrorism training center in Jordan that features 
“a state-of-the-art shoot house, three multi-purpose firing ranges, a simulated urban 
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environment, and upgraded student barracks, among other improvements” (U.S. 
Department of State, 2018). Considering that Jordan has had over 2,500 of it’s citizens 
join ISIS in the Syrian civil war, there is a grave concern that many of these foreign 
fighters will return home with their newfound radical ideologies (Diez, 2016). 
 When it comes to the military wing of Jordan’s fight against terror, there is a sort 
of no-holds-barred mentality. With hundreds of millions of dollars being funneled into its 
defense sector, Jordan has drastically improved its ground training and equipment, as 
well as its air force capabilities. Along with its increased technology and manpower, 
Jordan has also used effective intelligence tactics in previous campaigns against 
terrorism. Rothe (2015) states that in the early 2000s, Jordan’s main intelligence bureau, 
the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), utilized its connections with Sunni tribal 
leaders to oust Al-Qaeda from southwestern Iraq. The success of this operation (known as 
the “Anbar Awakening”) has encouraged Jordanian officials to take the same approach in 
its fight against AQI’s restructured progeny, the Islamic State. The GID is also planning 
on supplying weapons and training to Sunni tribes to help bolster the Islamic State’s 
expulsion from southwestern Iraq. If they are successful in this, a huge security burden 
will have been lifted from the Border Guard on the Kingdom’s north and west 
boundaries. Considering that many crucial trade routes between Iraq and Jordan have 
been under ISIS control, a reduction in their presence would cause a boost in economic 
activity for both countries (Rothe, 2015, p. 30). 
 Despite these advances in technology and training by the Jordanian armed forces, 
violent clashes between extremists and police still occur. Luck (2016) reports that in 
December of 2016, police responded to a call concerning a house fire. Upon arrival, they 
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discovered an ISIS sleeper cell. Four militants fired on the police officers and fled to the 
nearby city of Karak. They took hostages in the historic Karak Castle, where a shootout 
between the militants and police ensued. Just a few months earlier in March, police were 
engaged in a firefight with Islamic State fighters outside in the city of Irbid. These events 
are a stark reminder of the audacity the Islamic State possesses within its fighters (Luck, 
2016). 
 When it comes to community intervention, Jordan has established multiple 
avenues of combatting religious extremism. The Directorate for Combatting Extremism 
and the Community Peace Centre (CPC) are a few programs that the government has 
established to divert radicalization within the community. According to Chin, Gharaibeh, 
Woodham, & Deeb, (2016), the CPC “focuses on replacing radical thought with 
moderate interpretations of Islam.” Along with promoting moderate discourse, the CPC is 
responsible for the de-radicalization of extremists that have been detained in Jordan. 
Although countries like Singapore have successful track records of reforming 
incarcerated extremists, there is no information available on whether or not the Jordanian 
program has been effective (Chin et al., 2016). 
According to Rothe (2015) General	Aref	Al-Zaben,	commander	of	the	King	
Abdullah	Special	Operations	Training	Center	in	Amman,	suggests	using	a	tactic	that	
worked	in	combatting	the	message	of	the	Taliban.	While	in	Afghanistan,	General	Al-
Zaben	would	bring	a	moderate	Imam	with	him	to	villages	that	were	most	likely	to	be	
susceptible	to	radicalization	(Rothe,	2015,	p.	33).	This	idea	of	countering	dialogue	
with	dialogue	is	one	of	the	Kingdom’s	best	weapons	in	curbing	the	appeal	of	groups	
like	the	Islamic	State.	 
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 Another example of Jordan fighting this war of words can be seen with what is 
known as the Amman Message, or simply “The Message” (The Amman Message, 2018). 
This historical statement given by King Abdullah II in November 2004 was in response 
to religious terror groups using Islam as a basis to justify their actions. The purpose of the 
Amman Message was “to clarify to the modern world the true nature of Islam and the 
nature of true Islam”. To solidify the statement’s religious credibility, King Abdullah II 
sent three questions to 24 of the top religious schools around the world, where all schools 
and sects of Islam were represented. The questions were: Who is a Muslim? Is it 
permissible to declare someone an apostate (takfir)? Who has the right to undertake the 
issuing of fatwas (legal rulings)? Not only did these questions receive a concise response, 
but the Amman Message sparked the international adoption of what came to be known as 
“The Three Questions”; leading to the Ummah (nation) of Islam agreeing on a pluralistic, 
mutual agreement for the first time in over a thousand years (The Amman Message, 
2018). 
 Many of the failures of Jordan’s counter-terrorism approach do not come from 
lapses in intelligence or a lack of proactive and retroactive action. Although some 
departments may be permeated with corruption or inept personnel, overall Jordan’s 
counter-terrorism system is well trained, well funded, and rivals that of many developed 
western nations.  
 So what are the Hashemite Kingdom’s shortcomings when combatting terrorism? 
The major problems facing Jordan come from the fact that the country has traits that still 
resemble an authoritarian regime. This heavy hand of government will often alienate the 
populace and leave an uncomfortable divide between the state and the people. The state is 
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struggling to find a healthy balance between eliminating extremist discourse and 
imposing its political will on imams (Rothe, 2015, p. 34). Not only have the structured 
sermons been a cause for frustration, but the constant surveillance and limitations on 
what can be said has aggravated a large portion of parishioners.  
 People feel the government often over-steps its boundaries in its fight against 
terrorism. This can be seen explicitly in the lack of culpability for human rights violations 
that take place in the State Security Court (Jarrar, 2009, p. 23). The severity of the new 
counter-terrorism legislation, along with the processing of those that violate it, has caused 
an outcry not only from human rights groups like Amnesty International, but also from 
Islamist political groups such as the Islamic Action Front (Jarrar, 2009, p. 36). These 
groups worry that the strict nature of these laws will suppress the people’s voice and 
cause a “retreat from democratization” (Jarrar, 2009, p. 22). 
 The media is often a target of government scrutiny, as the state regularly shuts 
downs any political dissent that threatens stability. On one hand, striking down extremist 
propaganda is a vital technique used to combat terrorism. In fact, according to delegates 
from the Arab League that met with the Jordanian national news agency Petra, “using 
traditional and social media to counter terrorist groups' campaigns and propaganda was as 
important to fighting terrorism as using military means” (Ghazal, 2015). However, the 
state should not overly-interfere with media outlets that post opposing political views. 
Too much regulation within the media can delegitimize a denunciation of terrorist acts, 
making it difficult for the public to distinguish what is political opposition and what is 
extremist propaganda. Terrorist groups will claim that it is all government propaganda, 
citing the state’s heavy-handed media control for support. While many of these actions 
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are rooted in good intentions, some see this fight against terror as a way for the 
government to reinforce its control over the people. 
 On the tactical side, Jordan needs to focus more on the root causes of extremism 
inside its borders. The country has done a tremendous job countering attacks through its 
intelligence, policing, and community efforts. However, these are more reactionary 
approaches to counter-terrorism. In order to stunt the rate of radicalization, Jordan must 
cater to problems that spawn animosity and drive those to commit terrorist acts. 
According to Yom & Sammour (2017), high unemployment and poverty are known 
“push” factors that make violent extremism more appealing than an ordinary life. Issues 
in the education system do not provide the Jordanian youth with the necessary critical 
thinking skills to expand their potential, and often leave them susceptible to terrorist 
recruitment (Yom & Sammour, 2017). Overcrowding and a lack of infrastructure in 
urban areas that house refugees provide a hotbed for radicalization. This environment can 
breed contempt and promote a sense that the government has failed in its attempt to 
support equally both refugees and Jordanian citizens.  
 Foregoing Jordan’s flaws in counterterrorism, the state has come up with an 
unconventional approach to mollify radicals and hopefully reduce the number of terror 
attacks. When it comes to fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, the 
Hashemite Kingdom does more than implement an aggressive military campaign. While 
battling Al-Qaeda and now ISIS, Jordan has found that no matter how much damage is 
dealt to the enemy, jihadists still pop up within the Kingdom’s borders, ready to spread 
their ideology and cause harm. Instead of a strategy focused solely on eradication of 
extremists, Jordan has adopted a policy of containment and control.  
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This concept is a peculiar one; success hinders on finding a balance of appeasing 
jihadists with a government-permitted presence, while also keeping their actions and 
dialogue under control. According to Olidort (2017), having these extremist groups 
where the government can openly monitor them is a huge advantage for Jordan’s national 
security interests. On the other hand, some may view this as the state harboring violent 
jihadists. Without the utmost supervision, the public presence of certain extremist groups 
could enable the spread of radical ideology and increase the likelihood of an attack. 
Olidort stresses that the delicate contingencies of location and the process by which this 
is done can directly determine the success of this approach.  
According to Olidort (2017), a prime example of the success of this method is 
found with Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. A world-renowned Salafist ideologue, 
Albani was banned from Saudi Arabia and Syria due to fears that his discourse would 
cause instability. However, in the 1980s and 1990s during his final years in Jordan, 
Albani vehemently opposed violence and political activism. Many of his followers, who 
left groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to join Albani, continued to publically speak out 
against violent jihad (Olidort, 2017). Jordan hopes that through a conditional tolerance 
with jihadist groups, extremists will become less radical, channeling their frustrations 
through civil action rather than violence.  
 
Cross-examination 
 The greatest advantage to counterterrorism is the ability to cooperate with other 
nations to identify what has been successful and what has not. Jordan and the United 
States are two of the closest allies when it comes to the war on terror, and information 
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sharing between the two countries has been extensive to say the least. The objective of 
this thesis is to figure out whether techniques used by Jordan in their fight against terror 
could also be utilized by the United States.  
Three questions will be used to filter Jordan’s successes to see whether they will 
benefit the United	States: 1) Does this CT method/tool target a relatable issue? 
Although both countries are at war with violent extremism, the political, social, and 
cultural environments are very different in the United	States and Jordan, and thus some 
issues are applicable only to Jordan. 2) Has the United	States already implemented 
this strategy? Given that the two nations are such close allies, many things that are 
successful for one state have already been replicated in the other. 3) If not, would it be 
feasible/worthwhile to implement said strategy? The war on terror is protracted and 
strenuous on human and financial resources. Often times when a new initiative is 
implemented, it may take time, manpower, and funding away from another. For this 
reason, CT experts must determine the potential effectiveness of applying new 
approaches.  
 However, before analyzing methods that have worked for the Kingdom of Jordan 
and may possibly work for the United States, it is imperative that we look at the political 
structure of the two nations, and thus the effect it has on the enactment CT policy.  
 Being a constitutional monarchy, Jordan’s CT force benefits from having more 
control over public life. This streamlined system of government allows for easier and 
expedited passage of legislation. Although laws must pass through a bicameral legislature 
and be approved by the king, the monarch can use his power of dissolving parliament to 
threaten the legislature and speed things up. The king can also completely bypass 
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parliament by issuing a royal decree. With fewer government restrictions on the people’s 
right to privacy, Jordan is capable of getting away with more intensive surveillance and 
apprehensions of suspected terrorists. The kingdom also frequently shuts down 
publications or radical speakers that it finds threatening. Jordan’s justification is that 
possible destabilization could occur, where as in the U.S., no such reasoning would 
suffice. All of these aspects of the Jordanian system of government make it less 
restrictive for officials to act on suspected extremists.  
 However, the encroachment of the government on private life has been the cause 
of much civil dissent in Jordan. The constant regulation of mosques, media outlets, and 
other modes of expression has angered many citizens. This divide between the 
government and the people can ultimately end up backfiring on the state, as terrorist 
recruiters will use the ill will of the people to fuel its insurgency.  
 The United States holds some of the strongest beliefs in “rule of law” and the 
power of democracy. With the multiple checks placed on the government by other 
branches (as well as the voters), a natural balancing effect occurs when it comes to 
passing legislation. Very rarely does invasive legislation pass and remain law without the 
support of the people. When it comes to passing CT laws, the populace generally backs 
the government; as such legislation is normally seen as protecting the people rather than 
furthering government interests.  
America’s investment in due process and its weariness of encroaching 
government has provided its citizens with steadfast constitutional rights. However, these 
due process rights often slow the procedure of capturing and convicting suspected 
terrorists. Requiring such a high burden of proof to convict someone on a charge as 
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serious as terrorism, the judicial process may take years and the defendant could be 
released for many reasons. In some cases, such as the Orlando nightclub shooter, the lack 
of sufficient evidence restrained law enforcement officials from taking any further action. 
The constitutional rights that protect the rights of citizens can also become a quasi-
safeguard for terrorists to meander under.  
In reviewing counterterrorism policies and practices implemented by both Jordan 
and the United States, it is clear that these two nations are very similar in their 
approaches. This idea makes sense; both countries are strong allies and have aligned 
views when it comes to combatting extremism. They share resources, information, 
personnel, and most importantly, their strategies that have proven successful. Jordan and 
the United	States have similar enemies, such as jihadist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, 
but also have different political, social, and cultural atmospheres. For this reason, CT 
experts in America must analyze the environment in Jordan where these practices are 
being put into place. What works there might not be successful in the West, and vice 
versa. 
 One method in particular that is used by Jordan has the potential to be effective in 
the United States. Covered earlier in this thesis, the idea of containment and control of 
extremist groups has proved effective for Jordanian CT. To see if the United States 
should adopt this practice, we must run it through the three questions.  
 Does this target a relatable issue? Yes. Jordan has permitted the controlled 
existence of radical Islamist ideologues and jihadist operatives alike. These two groups 
are the most prevalent form of extremism within the country. However, in the U.S., 
jihadists aren’t the only extremist threat. Radical far-right and far-left groups that have 
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hardline views on religion, race, and government also threaten the safety and security of 
Americans.  White supremacist groups like the KKK and the Aryan nation, anarchic 
groups like Antifa, and several religious organizations such as the Jewish Defense 
League and the Army of God have engaged in violence. The government can use these 
activists’ rights to expression and assembly as an incentive to keep their agenda above 
ground. Although the presence of these groups in the sphere of public life will generate 
disapproving backlashes from the American people, the ability to easily monitor the 
actions and account for the membership of these organizations will greatly enhance 
public safety.  
 Has the United	States already implemented this strategy? No. Although the 
Constitution allows for these groups to openly speak, assemble, and protest, many local 
and state governments understandably try to limit the presence of these undesirable 
crowds.  
 Would this method of control and containment of extremist organizations be 
worthwhile? Yes. Allowing for the monitored yet mostly unhindered operation of these 
groups can allow easier supervision by law enforcement and an increased likelihood of 
stopping attacks before they happen. The ability to operate and voice their opinions freely 
may also open avenues of dialogue that communities can use to engage these groups and 
hopefully lessen the radical nature of some members.  
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